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We develop a model of investment with ﬁnancial constraints and use it to investigate
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quasi-rent on invested capital. This rent is priced into the value of the ﬁrm, so Tobin’s
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The standard model of investment with convex adjustment costs predicts that movements
in the investment rate should be entirely explained by changes in Tobin’s q. This prediction
has generally been rejected in empirical studies. Furthermore, several studies have shown
that cash ﬂow and other measures of current proﬁtability have a strong predictive power for
investment. This has been taken by many authors as prima facie evidence of the presence
of ﬁnancial constraints at the ﬁrm level.
Some recent papers – in particular Gomes (2001) and Cooper and Ejarque (2003) –
have challenged the above interpretation. These papers compute dynamic general equi-
librium models with ﬁnancial frictions, calibrate them, and look at the relation between
Tobin’s q and investment in the simulated series. They show that, in presence of ﬁnancial
frictions alone, Tobin’s q still explains most of the variability in investment, and cash ﬂow
does not provide any additional explanatory power. These results seem to echo a concern
raised by Chirinko (1993):
”Even though ﬁnancial market frictions impinge on the ﬁrm, q is a forward
looking variable capturing the ramiﬁcations of these constraints on all the ﬁrm’s
decisions. Not only does q reﬂect proﬁtable opportunities in physical investment
but, depending on circumstances, q capitalizes the impact of some or all ﬁnancial
c o n s t r a i n t sa sw e l l . ” 1
In this paper we analyze this issue using a model of investment with a ﬁnancial friction
due to limited enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts. We allow ﬁrms to use a rich set of state
contingent liabilities, which can include debt and equity claims. For each ﬁrm there is an
“insider,” which can be interpreted as the entrepreneur, the manager or the controlling
shareholder. The ﬁnancial constraint imposes a lower bound on the fraction of the ﬁrm’s
v a l u eh e l db yt h ei n s i d e ra te a c hp o i n ti nt i m e .I nt h i sf r a m e w o r k ,w ee x p l i c i t l yd e r i v et h e
market value of the total outstanding claims of the ﬁrm and use it to compute average q.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that the presence of the
ﬁnancial constraint introduces a positive wedge between average q and marginal q.T h i s
wedge reﬂects the tension between the future proﬁtability of investment and the availability
of internal funds in the short run. Second, we show that this wedge varies over time, and this
weakens the observed correlation between q and investment. Using a calibrated version of
our model, we show that our model can generate realistic correlations between investment,
q and cash-ﬂow.
The paper provides a tractable model of optimal long-term ﬁnancial contracts with ﬁ-
nancial frictions, that can be used to explore the relation between investment and asset
prices. The model has two main ingredients: convex adjustment costs with constant re-
turns to scale, as in the classic Hayashi (1982) model, and a speciﬁc assumption of limited
enforcement in ﬁnancial contracts that delivers a linear ﬁnancial constraint for the single
entrepreneur. Thanks to the second assumption, the problem of the individual entrepreneur
retains the linearity of the original Hayashi (1982) model. This makes it easier to compare
the model with ﬁnancial frictions with the frictionless benchmark. An additional advan-
tage of these assumptions is that aggregation is straightforward. In this sense, the model
retains the simplicity of a representative agent model, while allowing for rich dynamics of
the ﬁnancial constraint.
1Chirinko (1993) p. 1903.
2The main diﬀerence between our paper and the papers by Gomes (2001) and Cooper
and Ejarque (2003), is in the way we treat the ﬁnancial friction. Namely, they adopt a
relatively “reduced form” speciﬁcation, assuming a convex cost of outside ﬁnance, while we
derive explicitly the optimal ﬁnancial contract in an environment with limited enforcement.
Our paper is related to the large theoretical literature on the macroeconomic implications
of ﬁnancial frictions, e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Cooley,
Marimon and Quadrini (2004). The form of ﬁnancial imperfection presented in this paper
is close in spirit to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The main diﬀerence with that paper,
apart from the introduction of adjustment costs, is that we allow for fully state contingent
securities and that we introduce aggregate shocks explicitly.
A model that combines convex adjustment costs and ﬁnancial frictions is Bernanke
et al. (2000). There are two crucial diﬀerences between our approach and theirs. They
concentrate on short term ﬁnancial contracts, and on debt instruments. In the present
paper, instead we consider long term ﬁnancial arrangements, and we allow for fully state
contingent contracts. An advantage of our approach, is that we can deﬁne q looking at the
value of total ﬁnancial claims issued by the entrepreneurs, and therefore we can map the
measure of q in the model, with the q observed on ﬁnancial markets.
Our model is also related to the model of ﬁnancial contracting with limited enforcement
in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). The main diﬀerences between our setup and theirs
are the assumption of constant returns to scale and the way in which we model the outside
option of the entrepreneur. They assume that after default an entrepreneur goes into
autarky, while we assume that he loses a fraction of his wealth but retains access to ﬁnancial
markets. The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the optimal ﬁnancial
contract is linear in the entrepreneur’s initial wealth. This allows us to give a simple
characterization for the risk-management problem of the single entrepreneur. Moreover, it
greatly simplify aggregation and provides a tractable way of introducing ﬁnancial frictions
in a general equilibrium setting.
Following Fazzari et al. (1988) there has been a large empirical literature exploring the
relation between investment and asset prices in panel data. The great majority of these
papers have found small coeﬃcients on average q and positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
on cash ﬂow, or other variables describing the current ﬁnancial condition of a ﬁrm.2 An
early critical interpretation of these results was that cash ﬂow contained information re-
garding future proﬁts that, for some reason, (measurement error or non-fundamental stock
market movements) was not captured by the empirically observed q. This interpretation
was rejected by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), who show that cash ﬂow has signiﬁcant
additional predictive power on investment even after controlling for the information value
in current cash ﬂow.
The idea of looking at the statistical implications of a simulated model to understand
the empirical correlation between investment and q goes back to Sargent (1980). Recently
Gomes (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2001, 2003) and Abel and Eberly (2005) have followed
this route, introducing either ﬁnancial frictions or decreasing returns and market power
to try to match the existing empirical evidence. The conclusion one reaches from this
literature is that decreasing returns and market power can generate realistic correlations,
while ﬁnancial frictions do not help in matching the observed correlations. In this paper
we show that the second conclusion is unwarranted, and depends crucially on the way
2E.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998). See Hubbard (1998) for a
survey.
3one models the ﬁnancial constraint. On the other hand, there are some parallels between
our approach and these papers, in particular with the “growth options” approach of Abel
and Eberly (2005). Both approaches imply that movements in q may reﬂect changes in
future rents that are unrelated with current investment. In the current paper these rents
are not due to market power, but to the scarcity of entrepreneurial wealth, which evolves
endogenously.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section
3, we look at the optimal ﬁnancial contract from the point of view of a single entrepreneur.
Section 4 characterizes a competitive equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium relation
between investment and asset prices. Section 5 describes the calibration and simulation
results. In Section 6 we discuss some extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Preferences and technology. There are two groups of agents: consumers and entrepreneurs.
There are two goods, a perishable consumption good and physical capital. Each group of
agents is a continuum of mass 1. Consumers are inﬁnitely lived and have linear preferences
represented by the utility function
E
"
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βtct
#
.
They have a constant endowment of labor lC which they supply on the labor market each
period.
Entrepreneurs have random, ﬁnite lives. Each period a random fraction γ of entrepre-
neurs dies and is replaced by an equal mass of young entrepreneurs. Young entrepreneurs
are endowed with lE units of labor in the ﬁrst period of their life. We normalize total labor
supply to one, so that lC + γlE =1 .
The preferences of entrepreneur i,b o r na td a t et, are described by the utility function
Et
⎡
⎣
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β
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where Ji is the random duration of the entrepreneur’s life. We allow for the discount factors
of consumers and entrepreneurs, β and βE,t ob ed i ﬀerent. We assume that βE <β .T h i s
assumption, together with the assumption of a ﬁnite life for entrepreneurs, guarantees the
existence of a steady state where the borrowing constraint is always binding. We will further
discuss this assumption below.
Each period t entrepreneurs have access to a constant returns to scale technology de-
scribed by the concave production function AtF (ki,t,l i,t),w h e r eki,t is capital installed in
period t−1. The productivity parameter At is the same for all entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
face convex adjustment costs. By employing ko
i,t units of used capital, or “old capital,” and
G
³
ki,t+1,ko
i,t
´
units of the consumption good in period t an entrepreneur installs ki,t+1
units of new capital, ready for production in period t +1 . The function G is convex in
ki,t+1, homogeneous of degree 1 and satisﬁes G1 (k,k)=1 .
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of period t, production is realized
and entrepreneur i learns if period t is his last period of activity. Then, entrepreneurs
4exchange used capital. An entrepreneur can set ko
i,t 6= ki,t by trading the diﬀerence on the
used capital market. Finally, new capital is installed using old capital and consumption
goods as inputs. With this timing assumption entrepreneurs are able to liquidate all old
capital on their last period of activity, while continuing entrepreneurs acquire it from them.
The assumption that used capital is homogeneous and can be traded across ﬁr m si su s e f u lt o
simplify the entrepreneurs’ problem in the last period of their life. It also helps in modelling
the liquidation proceedings in the event an entrepreneur defaults.
Aggregate uncertainty is described by the Markov process st in the ﬁnite state space S,
with transition probability π (st+1|st).T h e s t a t e st determines current productivity ac-
cording to At = A(st). This general formulation will allow us to introduce both persistent
and temporary productivity shocks. The theory will be developed for the case of a ﬁnite
state space S, for ease of exposition. However, when we turn to the simulations we will use
continuous random variables. Individual uncertainty is described by the random variable
χi,t, which is equal to 1 in all the periods when entrepreneur i is active, except in the last
period, when χi,t =0 .
Financial contracts. Consider an entrepreneur born at time t. The entrepreneur ﬁ-
nances his current and future investment by selling a long-term ﬁnancial contract Ci,t.T h e
contract speciﬁes: a sequence of state-contingent transfers {di,t+s}
∞
s=0,3 a sequence of state-
contingent labor inputs, old capital inputs, and capital stocks
n
li,τ,ko
i,τ,k i,τ+1
o∞
τ=t
for all
the periods in which the entrepreneur is alive. The transfers and input levels are contingent
both on the history of aggregate shocks, {s0,s 1,...,s t}, and on the idiosyncratic termination
shock of entrepreneur i. The choice variables ko
i,τ and ki,τ+1, and the transfer di,τ,a r es e t
after the idiosyncratic termination shock is realized. Let qo
t denote the price of old capital
in period t. Feasibility requires that the transfers {di,τ} satisfy:
cE
i,τ + di,τ + G
¡
ki,τ+1,ko
i,τ
¢
≤ AτF (ki,τ,l i,τ) − wτli,τ − qo
τ
¡
ko
i,τ − ki,τ
¢
, (1)
for all the periods where the entrepreneur is active.4 All input levels and transfers are set
to zero afterwards.
Limited enforcement. Financial contracts are subject to limited enforcement. The en-
trepreneur has full control over the ﬁrm’s assets. In each period, after production takes
place, the entrepreneur can choose to divert part or all of the current proﬁts and the capital
stock. In this way he can capture up to a fraction (1 − θ) of the ﬁrm’s liquidation value,
vi,t, which is equal to current proﬁts plus the resale value of the capital stock:
vi,t = AtF (ki,t,l i,t) − wtli,t + qo
tki,t.
The only recourse outside investors have against such behavior is the liquidation of the ﬁrm.
Upon liquidation, the investors can recover the remaining fraction θ of the ﬁrm’s liquidation
value. After liquidation the entrepreneur can start anew with initial wealth (1 − θ)vi,t.T h a t
is, the only punishment for a defaulting entrepreneur is the loss of a fraction θ of the ﬁrm’s
3The transfer will typically be negative in the ﬁrst period (initial investment) and can be positive or
negative in the following periods, corresponding to dividend payments minus new investment in the ﬁrm.
4In the ﬁrst period of activity the constraint is:
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+ wtlE,
with ki,t =0 .
5liquidation value. Assuming that the entrepreneur is only allowed to re-enter the ﬁnancial
market after a certain number of periods would not alter the qualitative features of the
model. We discuss below the relation between this form of limited enforcement and other
contractual imperfections used in the literature.
3O p t i m a l ﬁnancial contracts
Before turning to the competitive equilibrium, we concentrate on the decision problem of a
single entrepreneur. We begin by introducing some preliminary deﬁnitions that will simplify
the analysis. Then we give a recursive characterization of the optimal ﬁnancial contract
and show that, under constant returns to scale and given the notion of limited enforcement
introduced above, the optimal ﬁnancial contract is linear.
3.1 Preliminaries
We will study equilibria where consumers always have positive consumption, ct > 0.T h e r e -
fore, the price of a sequence of state-contingent transfers {di,t+s}
∞
s=0 is equal to its expected
present value, discounted at the rate β. A ne n t r e p r e n e u rb o r na td a t et will choose the
ﬁnancial contract Ci,t to maximize his expected utility subject to feasibility, (1), to the
intertemporal budget constraint:
∞ X
s=0
βsEt [di,t+s] ≥ 0,
and to the condition that future promised transfers be credible. The last condition is
satisﬁed if, at each date, the entrepreneur prefers repayment to diversion and default. This
condition is stated formally below. For a recursive formulation of the problem it is useful
to deﬁne the net present value of the ﬁrm’s liabilities at date τ:
bi,τ =
∞ X
s=0
βsEτ [diτ+s].
The entrepreneur’s problem can be simpliﬁed by exploiting the assumption of constant
returns to scale. Under constant returns to scale the liquidation value of the ﬁrm can be
written as:
vi,t = Rtki,t =m a x
li,t
{AtF (ki,t,l i,t) − wtli,t + qo
tki,t},
where Rt, the gross return on capital, is taken as given by the single entrepreneur and is a
function of the prices wt and qo
t. Also, constant returns to scale for G, and the presence of
a competitive market for old capital, imply that there exists a shadow price of new capital,
qm
t , such that:
qm
t ki,t+1 =m i n
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i,t
©
qo
tko
i,t + G(ki,t+1,ko
i,t)
ª
. (2)
Thanks to constant returns to scale, the value of qm
t is a function of qo
t and, thus, is taken
as given by the single entrepreneur.5
5The ﬁrst order condition for problem (2) gives:
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6Note that in this model there is a one-to-one relation between the investment rate and
the shadow price of new capital:
qm
t = G1
µ
ki,t+1
ki,t
,1
¶
(3)
That is, this shadow price corresponds to the usual deﬁnition of marginal q and is a suﬃcient
statistic for the ﬁrm’s investment rate. The open question is whether the q observed in
ﬁnancial markets corresponds to marginal q in a model with ﬁnancial frictions. This is the
issue we address in 4.1.
Putting together the deﬁnitions above, the feasibility constraint (1) can be written as:6
cE
i,τ + di,τ + qm
τ ki,τ+1 ≤ vi,τ. (4)
3.2 Recursive characterization
We study recursive competitive equilibria, where the state of the economy is captured by a
vector of aggregate state variables Xt ∈ X, including the exogenous state st, with transition
probability H (Xt+1|Xt). The vector Xt will be deﬁned and discussed in section 4. For now,
consider a single entrepreneur, who takes as given the law of motion for Xt.T h es t a t eXt
determines the wage rate, wt, and the price of used capital, qo
t. Therefore, it also determines
the gross rate of return, Rt, and the shadow price of new capital, qm
t . Let this dependence
be captured by the functions R(Xt) and qm (Xt).
Now we can use a recursive approach to characterize the optimal ﬁnancial contract.
The individual state variables for the entrepreneur are given by vi,t, bi,t,a n dχi,t.D e ﬁne
W (v,b;χ,X) as the expected utility, in state X, of an entrepreneur who controls a ﬁrm
with liquidation value v and outstanding liabilities b.7 The expected utility W is deﬁned at
the time when production has already taken place and the idiosyncratic termination shock
has been observed. Also, W is deﬁned after the default decision has taken place, assuming
that the entrepreneur does not default in the current period. For now, we will assume that
the entrepreneur’s problem has a solution in each state X ∈ X, and the expected utility W
is ﬁnite. This will be the case in the recursive equilibria we study below (see Proposition
(4)).
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Therefore q
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6The ﬁrst order condition for problem (2) (see footnote 5) and constant returns to scale give:
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Substituting in the feasibility constraint and rearranging we obtain (4).
For a newborn entrepreneur the constraint is:
c
E
i,t + di,t + q
m
t ki,t+1 ≤ wtlE.
7For a newborn entrepreneur, v is the entrepreneur’s initial labor income, and b is zero.
7In all periods prior to the last period of activity, i.e. for χ =1 , W satisﬁes the Bellman
equation:
W (v,b;1,X)= m a x
cE,d
k0,v0(.),b0(.)
cE + βEE[W
¡
v0,b 0;χ0,X0¢
|X] (P)
s.t.
cE + d + qm (X)k0 ≤ v, (5)
b = d + βE[b0 ¡
χ0,X0¢
|X], (6)
v0 ¡
X0¢
= R
¡
X0¢
k0 ∀X0, (7)
W(v0 ¡
X0¢
,b 0 ¡
χ0,s 0¢
;χ0,X0) ≥ W((1 − θ)v0 ¡
X0¢
,0;χ0,X0) ∀χ0,X0, (8)
where the conditional expectation E[.|X] is computed according to the transition H (X0|X),
with χ0 independent of X0.
Problem (P) can be interpreted as follows. At each date, an entrepreneur who does
not default has to decide how to allocate the current ﬁrm’s resources, v, to its potential
uses: payments to insiders, cE, payment to outsiders, d, and investment in physical capital,
qmk0. This is captured by the feasibility constraint (5). Moreover, the entrepreneur has
to satisfy the “promise keeping” constraint (6): current and future payments to outsiders
have to cover the current liabilities of the ﬁrm, b. The current payments are d,t h ef u t u r e
payments are captured by the net present value of the ﬁrm’s liabilities in the following
period, b0 (χ0,X0). These liabilities are allowed to be contingent on the realization of the
idiosyncratic termination shock χ0 and of the aggregate state X0.8 Constraint (7) simply
says that liquidation value of the ﬁrm next period will be given by the total returns on the
ﬁrm’s installed capital k0. Finally, the no-default constraint (8) ensures that, in all future
states of the world, the future liabilities b0 are credible. The no-default constraint take this
form, given that the entrepreneur has the option to default and start anew with a fraction
(1 − θ)v0 of the ﬁrm’s liquidation value and zero liabilities.
An entrepreneur in his last period of activity will simply liquidate all capital and pay
existing liabilities. Therefore, for χ =0we have:
W(v,b;0,X)=v − b.
Lemma 1 The value function satisﬁes
W (v,b;χ,X)=W (v − b,0;χ,X)
and the no-default condition can be written as
b ≤ θv. (9)
Proof. The ﬁrst result follows by simply substituting d in problem (P).T op r o v et h e
second result it is suﬃcient to show that W is monotone increasing in its ﬁrst argument.
Lemma 1 allows us to replace constraint (8) with constraint (9). The latter can be
interpreted as a “collateral constraint,” where the total value of the entrepreneur liabilities
are bounded from above by a fraction θ of the liquidation value of the ﬁrm.
8In equilibrium the distribution of all the elements of X
0, conditional on the exogenous state s
0, will be
degenerate. Therefore, we could restrict b
0 to be contingent only on χ
0 and s
0.W ea l l o wb
0 to be contingent
on all the elements of X
0 only for notational convenience.
8An alternative set of assumptions that would deliver the same “collateral constraint” is
the following: (1) the entrepreneur loses access to the technology after default, (2) before
liquidation takes place there is a round of renegotiation, and (3) in the renegotiation stage
the entrepreneur can make a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer to the outside investors. With these
assumptions, the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, and whenever the net present
value of the entrepreneur’s outstanding liabilities exceeds θv he will renegotiate them down
to θv. Apart from the presence of state-contingent dividends, this is the set of assumptions
used in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
If we replace constraint (8) with constraint (9), problem (P) is linear and we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 The value function W (.,.;χ,X) is linear in its ﬁrst two arguments and
takes the form:
W (v,b;1,X)=φ(X)(v − b),
W (v,b;0,X)=v − b.
There is an optimal policy for k0,c E,dand b0 which is linear in v − b.
Deﬁne the net worth of entrepreneur i:
ni,t = vi,t − bi,t.
This variable represents the diﬀerence between the market value of the ﬁrm’s capital (in-
cluding current proﬁts) and the value of the claims issued to outsiders. Proposition 2 shows
that the expected utility of the entrepreneur is a linear function of the entrepreneur net
worth. The factor φ, which determines the marginal value of the entrepreneur net worth,
depends on current and future prices, and hence it is, in general, dependent on X.
The following proposition gives a further characterization of the optimal solution.
Proposition 3 For a given law of motion H (X0|X),l e tφ(X) be deﬁned by the recursion:
φ(X)=m a x
½
βE (1 − θ)E[(γ +( 1− γ)φ(X0))R(X0)|X]
qm (X) − βθE[R(X0)|X]
,1
¾
. (10)
Suppose that
βφ(X) ≥ βEφ
¡
X0¢
(11)
for all pairs X,X0 such that H (X0|X) > 0. Then, the optimal policy for the individual
entrepreneur involves: (i) k0 > 0, (ii) cE =0if φ(X) > 1,a n d( i i i )b(1,X0)=θv(X0) if
βφ(X) >β Eφ(X0).
A central result of this proposition is point (iii), which characterizes the cases where
the state contingent liabilities are set to their maximum level. Consider an entrepreneur in
state X choosing his ﬁnancial liabilities next period, in state X0. The entrepreneur compares
the marginal value of a dollar today, φ(X), to the marginal value of a dollar tomorrow,
given by βEφ(X0)H (X0|X).O nt h eﬁnancial market, the price of a dollar in state X0 is
βH (X0|X). Therefore, if (11) holds as a strict inequality, then it is optimal to borrow as
much as possible against the revenue realized in state X0 and use the proceeds to invest
today.
93.3 An asset pricing interpretation
Consider the ratio
m
¡
X0,X
¢
= βE
γ +( 1− γ)φ(X0)
φ(X)
,
this ratio represents the shadow discount factor for the entrepreneur, i.e. it represents the
ratio of the marginal value of inside wealth tomorrow, in state X0, to the marginal value of
inside wealth today.
Let ˜ R represent the leveraged rate of return on entrepreneurial net worth:
˜ R
¡
X0,X
¢
≡
(1 − θ)R(X0)
qm (X) − βθE[R(X0)|X]
.
For each dollar of net worth the entrepreneur can borrow up to qm/(qm − βθE[R0|X])
dollars today, because he can pledge a fraction θ of the gross return E[R0|X] and sell it to
the consumers. This investment yields a return Rt+1/qm
t , of which the entrepreneur will
retain a fraction (1 − θ).
Then, condition (10) can be rewritten as the familiar asset pricing expression
E
h
m
¡
X0,X
¢ ˜ R
¡
X0,X
¢
|X
i
=1 .
Notice that consumers do not have access to direct investment in entrepreneurial capital,
so this condition does not hold using the consumers’ discount factor. Using condition (11)
one can show that:
βE
h
˜ R|X
i
≥ E
h
m ˜ R|X
i
=1 .
This inequality also implies that the market return on non-leveraged entrepreneurial capital
also is larger than 1, that is,
βE
∙
R(X0)
qm (X)
|X
¸
≥ 1
The diﬀerence βE[R0]/qm − 1 is sometimes called the “external ﬁnance premium,” as it
reﬂects the premium that outsiders would be willing to pay to invest directly in the ﬁrms’
capital. This premium is closely related to the wedge between average q and marginal q,
that will be analyzed below.
4 Equilibrium and asset prices
We are now in a position to deﬁne a recursive competitive equilibrium. The aggregate state
is given by
X =( K,B,s),
where K is the aggregate capital stock and B represents the aggregate liabilities of the
entrepreneurs who are not in their last period of activity.
A recursive competitive equilibrium is given by a transition probability, H (X0|X),s u c h
that the optimal behavior of entrepreneurs is consistent with this transition probability, and
the goods market, labor market, and capital market clear. The formal deﬁnition is given in
the Appendix.
A crucial property of our model is that the entrepreneur’s problem is linear, and we
obtain optimal policies that are linear in entrepreneurial net worth, vi,t − bi,t.G i v e n t h e
10linearity of the optimal policies it is straightforward to aggregate the behavior of the entre-
preneurial sector. We illustrate the aggregation properties of the model in the case where
the collateral constraint is always binding. This is the case where the condition
βφ(X) >β Eφ
¡
X0¢
(12)
holds for every pair X,X0 such that H (X0|X) > 0. Proposition 4 shows that, in economies
with “small” productivity shocks, such an equilibrium exists. This case will be the basis
for the numerical analysis in the next section. In section 6 we discuss the more general case
where the ﬁnancial constraint is occasionally binding.
Condition 12 implies that, in each state X, the state-contingent liabilities are set to
their maximum level for each future value of X0,i . e .b0 (χ0,X0)=θv0 (X0). Therefore, the
optimal level of investment is given by:
k0 =
1
qm (X) − βθE[R(X0)|X]
(v − b). (13)
Consider an economy that enters period t with an aggregate stock of capital Kt,i n
the hands of old entrepreneurs. The agents who invest in period t are: a mass (1 − γ) of
the old entrepreneurs, who have vi,t = Rtki,t and bi,t = θRtki,t,a n dam a s sγ of newborn
entrepreneurs with vi,t = wtlE. Therefore, the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth of
investing entrepreneurs is:9
Nt =( 1− γ)(1− θ)RtKt + γwtlE,
Using the optimal policy (13) and aggregating we obtain:
Kt+1 =
1
qm
t − βθEt [Rt+1]
Nt.
From these two equations we get the following law of motion for the aggregate capital stock
Kt+1 =
(1 − γ)(1− θ)RtKt + γwtlE
qm
t − βθEt [Rt+1]
. (14)
The next proposition shows that for a Cobb-Douglas economy with quadratic adjustment
costs and bounded productivity shocks, we can construct a recursive equilibrium of this type.
Let the production function and the adjustment cost function be:
AtF (kt,l t)=Atkα
t l1−α
t , (15)
G(kt+1,k t)=kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt +
ξ
2
(kt+1 − kt)
2
kt
. (16)
Let the unconditional mean of At be ˆ A, and let the support of At be
£
A,A
¤
.T o s h o w
that a recursive equilibrium with binding constraint exists we ﬁrst check that there is a
deterministic steady state with binding constraints. This requires that θ is not too large,
inequality (A1) in the Appendix ensures that. Second, to obtain local stability of the
recursive equilibrium around the deterministic steady state it is necessary to impose an
additional restriction on the model parameters. This restriction is given by inequality (A2)
in the Appendix. Under these two restrictions the following proposition holds.
9Here, we are assuming that the average ki,t for the fraction (1 − γ) of old entrepreneurs who do not die
in period t,i se q u a lt oKt. That is, we are assuming that an appropriate law of large numbers apply to our
continuum of entrepreneurs.
11Proposition 4 Suppose the parameters
n
α,ξ,θ,γ,β,βE, ˆ A,lE
o
satisfy conditions (A1) and
(A2) in the Appendix. Then the economy with constant productivity A(s)= ˆ A has a deter-
ministic steady state with βER>1.F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h e r ei sa∆ > 0 such that if the process
A(s) satisﬁes A − A < ∆, then there exists a recursive competitive equilibrium where the
ﬁnancial constraint is always binding.
4.1 Average q and marginal q
We are now in a position to deﬁne the ﬁnancial value of a representative ﬁrm. The value of
the ﬁrm is simply the sum of all the claims on the ﬁrm’s future proﬁt s ,h e l db yi n s i d e r sa n d
outsiders. That is, it is equal to the net present value of the payments cE
i,t+s and di,t+s.10
This leads us to the following expression for the value of the ﬁrm:
si,t = W
¡
vi,t,b i,t;χi,t,X t
¢
+ bi,t − di,t − cE
i,t.
Where W corresponds to the net present value of the payments to the insider (including
current payments) and bi,t corresponds to the net present value of the payments to outsiders
(including current payments). We subtract the current payments, di,t + cE
i,t, to obtain the
end-of-period (ex-dividend) value of the ﬁrm.
Normalizing the ﬁnancial value of the ﬁrm by the total capital invested we obtain our
deﬁnition of average q
qi,t ≡
si,t
ki,t+1
.
Note that, for an entrepreneur in the last period of activity, both si,t and ki,t+1 are zero,
so qi,t is not well deﬁned. On the other hand, for continuing entrepreneurs, it is possible to
show qi,t is the same for all agents, and we denote it simply by qt.
Proposition 5 Average q is greater or equal than marginal q, qt ≥ qm
t with a strict inequal-
ity if the ﬁnancial constraint is binding.
Proof. Given that φt ≥ 1 we have
si,t = φt (vi,t − bi,t)+bi,t − di,t − cE
i,t ≥ vi,t − bi,t − cE
i,t = qm
t ki,t+1.
Notice that, absent ﬁnancial constraints we have φt =1and qt = qm
t . In this case the
model boils down to the Hayashi (1982) model, and qt is a suﬃcient statistic for investment,
given that qm
t i s ,a sw eo b s e r v e di n3 . 1 .
On the other hand, in presence of ﬁnancial frictions there is a wedge between the value
of the entrepreneur’s claims in case of liquidation (vi,t − bi,t) and the value of the claims he
holds to future proﬁts.
If we used the factor φt to discount the value of future proﬁts that go to the entrepre-
neurs, we would get
φt (vt − bt)
φt
+ bt − dt − cE
t = qm
t kt+1
10Note that for an entrepreneur it is optimal to invest all his wealth in his own ﬁrm, and he receives no
labor income after his ﬁrst period of life. Therefore all his consumption, c
E
i,t+s,i sﬁnanced by pay-outs from
the ﬁrm.
12and average and marginal q will be equal. However, all the ﬁrm’s claims are priced at
market prices, i.e. using the discount factor of outside investors. Then, the presence of
φt > 1 introduces a form of mis-measurement in a fraction of the ﬁrm’s current value and
creates a wedge between qt and qm
t .
The presence of φt > 1 is closely related to the presence of a positive external ﬁnance
premium as deﬁned in 3.3. The recursive relation 10 shows that φt is a forward looking
variable that cumulates the expected values of the future returns on leveraged net worth
˜ Rt+s which, in turns, are closely related to the external ﬁnance premium. Therefore, the
value of φt will be larger when entrepreneurs expect a positive external ﬁnancial premium in
future periods. This generates a source of variability in qt, which is unrelated to movements
in qm
t , and hence in investment. This variability is analyzed in the following section.
As a side remark, notice that in this model there is a one-to-one relation between qm
t
and qo
t, therefore if the price of used capital was observed it would be a suﬃcient statistic
for total investment. The price qo
t is the price at which liquidating entrepreneurs sell used
capital, so its empirical counterpart are the prices paid for acquisitions and for sales of used
capital equipment. This points to a potential alternative way of measuring qt that does
not rely on ﬁnancial market data. The presence of this relation, however, relies heavily on
the absence of adjustment costs for the transfer of used capital and on the way in which
we model ﬁrms’ exit. In this model ﬁrms are all identical and exit is an exogenous event,
therefore qo
t for exiting ﬁrms corresponds to qo
t for all ﬁrms. In a more realistic model,
the value of qo
t for exiting ﬁr m sw o u l dn o tb er e p r e s e n t a t i v eo ft h es h a d o wv a l u ef o ro t h e r
ﬁrms. Therefore, this alternative empirical strategy is also subject to serious measurement
problems.
5 Investment Dynamics
5.1 Calibration
In this section we examine the quantitative implications of the model, looking at the be-
havior of investment, average q and cash-ﬂow. We focus on economies where the ﬁnancial
constraints is always binding, i.e. where Proposition (4) applies. The production function
is Cobb-Douglas and adjustment costs are quadratic, as speciﬁed in (15) and (16). The
baseline parameters are:
α =0 .33; δ =0 .05; ξ =5 ;
β =0 .97; βE =0 .969;
θ =0 .6; γ =0 .12; lE =0 .3.
The values for α and δ are standard. The time period represents a year, and we set
β to match a risk-free interest rate of 3%. The adjustment cost ξ is set to 5. This value
is much smaller than the values usually derived from q theory equations. Absent ﬁnancial
frictions, the coeﬃcient for q in an investment regression is equal to 1/ξ.T h e r e f o r e , t o
match the low value of the coeﬃcient empirically estimated –typically smaller than 0.1–
o n en e e d st oa s s u m eal a r g ev a l u ef o rξ, which implies unrealistic levels of the average
adjustment costs. Setting ξ =5means that in absence of ﬁnancial frictions the coeﬃcient
on q would be 0.2. The value for θ is set to 0.6. The parameter θ is approximately equal
to the fraction of investment ﬁnanced with outside funds. Fazzari et al. (1988) report that
30% of manufacturing investment is ﬁnanced externally. Therefore, by choosing θ =0 .6 we
13choose a very conservative value for this parameter, biasing our results in the direction of
t h ec a s eo fn oﬁnancial constraints. The parameters γ and lE are chosen to give an outside
ﬁnance premium of 3%, close to the one in Bernanke et al. (2000). We experimented with
diﬀerent values of γ and lE and found out that, as long as the ﬁnance premium remains
constant, the speciﬁc choice of these parameters has little eﬀect on our results. The choice
of βE is conventional. By experimenting with diﬀerent values of βE we found that the value
of βE only aﬀects the average value of q, but has no eﬀect on the correlations we consider.
On the other hand, the choice of βE is relevant to check that the conditions of Proposition
4a r ev e r i ﬁed. In particular, a value of βE closer to β means that the range of At has to be
smaller.
The productivity parameter At is given by
At = eat
where at follows the process
at = xt + ηt
xt = ρxt−1 +  t
The shocks ηt and  t are Gaussian, i.i.d. shocks, and ρ =0 .95. Allowing for both temporary
and persistent shocks turns out to be relevant, especially when we look at the univariate
correlation between investment and q. To apply proposition 4 we need bounded values for
At. This is achieved simply by truncating the values for At, obtained from the process
above. Clearly, for small levels of σ2
η and σ2
 , the truncation is immaterial.
5.2 Impulse-response functions
Figure 1 shows the impulse-response functions for investment, q and cash-ﬂow, following a
persistent shock,  t. The investment rate is given by:
it ≡
It − δKt
Kt
,
qt is reported in log deviations from the steady state, and cash ﬂo w( n o r m a l i z e db yt h e
capital stock) is deﬁned as:
cft ≡
AtF (Kt,L t) − wtLt
Kt
=
αAtKα
t
Kt
= αAtKα−1
t .
In the right column we also report, for reference, the impulse-response functions for
productivity, At, for the “wedge” between average and marginal q,d e ﬁned as qt − qm
t ,a n d
for the capital stock (in log deviations from the steady state).
Following a persistent technology shock, investment, average q,a n dc a s hﬂow increase
on impact, as in the standard model without ﬁnancial frictions. However, now q increases
for two reasons. First, marginal q is increasing with investment. On top of that, φt is
increasing, since ﬁrms anticipate that the ﬁnancial constraint will be tighter in the periods
immediately following the shock. This increases the wedge between average q and marginal
q and magniﬁes the response of q to the shock.
Why is the ﬁnancial constraint is tighter in the periods following the shock? Due to the
persistent nature of the shock, future proﬁtability increases and this increases the expected
14returns, Rt+s. At the same time, entrepreneurs’ inside funds have increased because of the
increase in current cash ﬂow. However, initially, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and the rate of
return on entrepreneurial net worth increases.
In later periods, investment and cash ﬂow remain above their steady state levels. How-
ever, now q decreases below its steady state level. In this phase, the wedge is moving in the
opposite direction. This happens because future proﬁts are now smaller, as productivity is
going back towards its steady state value. At the same time, the entrepreneurs’ net worth
has increased thanks to the proﬁts accumulated in the early phase. Therefore, in later
periods the ﬁnancial constraint is less tight and the wedge falls. This accounts for the fall
in average q in the later periods.
This dynamic responses illustrate the fact that the movements in the wedge depend on
the tension between the desired level of investment (driven by expected productivity) and
the availability of funds (driven by past productivity). As the wedge varies over time, the
one-to-one relation between q and investment is broken.
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Figure 1. Impulse response functions to a persistent shock.
A temporary productivity shock provides an even starker example of the eﬀects of the
time-varying wedge. The impulse-responses for the shock ηt are plotted in Figure 2. In this
case investment and cash ﬂow jump temporarily above their steady state levels. However,
average q jumps below its steady state level and then gradually adjusts back.
A temporary shock can be viewed as a pure wealth shock to entrepreneurs. This shock
has no eﬀect on future proﬁtability, but changes the availability of funds to invest. The
direct result of the shock is that entrepreneurs are less ﬁnancially constrained and increase
investment. As the capital stock moves towards its ﬁrst best level the return on entrepre-
neurial capital falls, and so does the wedge between average and marginal q. Marginal q
is still increasing, due to the increase in investment. However, the net eﬀect is to decrease
average q.
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Figure 2. Impulse response functions to a temporary shock.
5.2.1 Raw correlations
Before turning to regressions and to conditional correlations, it is useful to address a ba-
sic question. Can our model can replicate the very weak observed correlation between q
and investment? That is, can we replicate the simple univariate relation between q and
investment?
In Figure 3 we plot the relationships between investment and q, and investment and
cash ﬂow, for an economy with only persistent shocks. There is almost a perfect linear
relationship between investment and cash ﬂow, and there is a noisy relationship between
investment and q. The reason for the noisy relationship between investment and q is the
time variation in the wedge described above.
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Figure 3.
Simulated values for (i,q) and (i,cf), with only persistent shocks.
However, the correlation between investment and q i ss t i l lq u i t es t r o n g .I fw er e g r e s s
investment on q we obtain a coeﬃcient of 0.07 and an R2 close to 0.60.
16This correlation disappears once we consider the polar case of an economy with only
temporary shocks, which is plotted in Figure 4. In this case, average q actually displays
a weak negative relationship with investment. At the same time, the relation between
investment and cash ﬂow still displays an almost perfect ﬁt.
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Figure 4.
Simulated values for (i,q) and (i,cf), with only temporary shocks.
Now, if we regress investment on q we obtain a coeﬃcient of −0.07, and, more importantly,
an R2 close to zero.
By experimenting with the case where both temporary and persistent shocks are present,
we found out that there is a simple monotone relation between the relative size of temporary
shocks and the correlation (and R2) between investment and q. That is, the model is able
to replicate the weak correlation between q and investment observed in the data, if we
introduce suﬃciently large temporary shocks in the model.
5.2.2 Multivariate regression
Now we turn to standard investment regressions, and we ask whether our model can replicate
the coeﬃcients on q and cash ﬂow observed in the data. To do so, we simulate our model
and we generate 500 sample series of 200 periods of artiﬁcial data. For each simulated series,
we run the standard investment regression:
it = a0 + a1qt + a2cft + et.
Existing empirical estimates of this regression are mostly based on panel data, while
our model immediate implications are in terms of time series. However, it is not diﬃcult to
extend our model to a version with heterogeneous productivity shocks, and local input and
capital markets. If we assume that ﬁrms in “sector” j a r eh i tb yt h ep r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c kAjt,
and that labor and old capital are immobile across sectors, the panel implications of our
model are identical to its time series implications. One can rewrite the model introducing
a sector-speciﬁc wage rate wjt and a sector-speciﬁc price of old capital qo
jt, and the results
obtained above carry over at the sector level. An alternative approach would be to intro-
duce heterogeneity and decreasing returns at the individual level, instead of the “external”
decreasing returns that we have assumed so far. The reason we do not go that way, for the
moment, is that other papers (Gomes (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2001, 2003)) have shown
17that decreasing returns can weaken the relation between q and investment. Therefore, by
keeping our assumption of “external” decreasing return, we study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
frictions in isolation.
As a reference point, we consider the coeﬃcients obtained in Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), which are reported in Table 1.
q (s.e.) cf (s.e.)
0.033 0.242
(0.016) (0.038)
Table 1. GH (1995) Empirical multivariate investment regressions.
Multivariate regression results for the simulated model are presented in Table 2. We
consider the case where both temporary and persistent shocks are present and we report the
results for diﬀerent values of the ratio σ2
pers/σ2
tot. For a high fraction of persistence shocks
(80%) we can approximately match the empirical coeﬃcients of Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995). Also note that the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow is at least twice as large as the coeﬃcient
o ni n v e s t m e n t ,r e g a r d l e s so ft h em i xo fs h o c k s .
σ2
pers/σ2
tot q (s.d.) cf (s.d.)
1 0.016 0.73
(.00) (.01)
0.8 0.048 0.26
(.01) (0.05)
0.6 0.056 0.15
(.01) (.01)
0.4 0.057 0.12
(.01) (.00)
0.2 0.055 0.12
(.01) (.00)
0 0.050 0.12
(.00) (.00)
Table 2. Multivariate regression results. Average coeﬃcients and standard deviations.
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6.1 Occasionally binding constraints
So far we have assumed that shocks are small enough that Proposition 4 applies and the
ﬁnancial constraint is always binding. This assumption is a useful simpliﬁcation for two
reasons. First, it reduces the state space for a recursive equilibrium to Kt, while in general
the state space is given by both Bt and Kt. Second, the optimal ﬁnancial contracts is simply
given by
Bt+1 = θRt+1Kt+1
while in the general case, the optimal ﬁnancial contract is described by a function of the
type
D(st+1,B t,K t)
18which can specify diﬀerent payments for each realization of the exogenous state st+1 next
period.
As a ﬁrst step in the analysis of the general case, we consider here the case of an economy
that is hit by a single temporary shock at time τ. After time τ, the productivity level is
deterministic and equal to A. If the temporary shock is suﬃciently large, the ﬁrms enter
ap a t hi nw h i c ht h eﬁnancial constraint is not binding for the ﬁrst T − τ periods, and is
binding again afterwards. In particular, condition (11) holds as an equality for t, τ ≤ t ≤ T,
and we have
φt =( 1− γ)φt+1 + γ
Condition (10) tells us that in this case investment is determined by the condition
qt = βRt+1
and the evolution of entrepreneurial wealth is given by
Nt+1 =
1 − γ
β
Nt + γwtLE
Since the rate of return on entrepreneurial wealth is lower than in steady state, entrepre-
neurial wealth declines over time up to the point where the ﬁnancial constraint is binding
again.
The dynamics of investment in this case are illustrated in Figure 5 for diﬀerent values of
the temporary shock. In the ﬁrst panel of Figure 5 we report the dynamics of entrepreneurial
wealth N, in percentage deviations from the steady state. In the second panel, we report
the dynamics of the investment rate. The ﬁgure shows that the relation between cash-ﬂow
shocks and investment is non-linear and that the propagation depends on the size of the
shocks. For small shocks the ﬁrm uses all the extra cash ﬂow to invest in physical capital,
so the eﬀe c ta ti m p a c t( n o r m a l i z e db yt h es i z eo ft h eshock) is large, but it dies out quickly.
For large shocks the ﬁrm instead invests only a fraction of the extra cash ﬂow in physical
capital, and invests the rest at the risk free rate. The ﬁrm eﬀectively is accumulating cash
reserves to be used for investment in the following periods. The impact eﬀect is smaller
(when normalized by the size of the shock) but the response of investment is more persistent.
These dynamics are driven by the interaction of the ﬁnancial constraint and the adjustment
cost. With no ﬁnancial constraint the temporary shock would have no eﬀect on investment,
and with no adjustment cost the temporary shock would only have temporary eﬀects on
investment.
The interest in this result lays in the fact that with occasionally binding constraints, we
can reduce the eﬀect of cash ﬂow on investment and we can increase the serial correlation of
the investment rate after a temporary shock. If one goes back to the simulations reported in
Table 2 and compares them with the Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) coeﬃcients reported
in Table 1 one can see that both eﬀects help match the empirical evidence for low levels of
σ2
pers/σ2
tot.
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Figure 5. Impulse response functions of entrepreneurs’ wealth N (top panel)
and investment rate I (bottom panel) to temporary shocks of various sizes.
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In this paper we have developed a tractable framework for thinking about the eﬀect of
ﬁnancial frictions on asset prices and Tobin’s q. The main conclusion is that, in the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions q may reﬂect some of the future rents that will go to the insider. Since
the insider’s shadow discount factor is diﬀerent from the market discount factor, these future
rents are “mispriced,” and the ﬁnancial value of the ﬁrm appears larger than the value of
installed capital. As a consequence Tobin’s q is larger than one.
Using a calibrated version of our model, we have explored its quantitative implications
for the correlations between investment, q and cash ﬂow measures. The model can replicate
the low correlation between q and investment observed both in aggregate and in micro data.
Moreover, the model can replicate the coeﬃcients on q and cash ﬂow obtained in panel data
regressions.
The model is stylized in many respects. We have decided to stay as close as possible
to the original Hayashi (1982) environment, to focus on the “pure” eﬀect of the ﬁnancial
friction. On the other hand, to retain the constant returns to scale features of the Hayashi
(1982) model, we have built a model where heterogeneity plays a very limited role. For
example, in our model, reallocating funds across entrepreneurs would have no eﬀects on
aggregate investment dynamics. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to the case
of decreasing returns to scale, where heterogeneity plays a much richer role.
Also, to simplify the analysis, we have considered the case of risk neutral consumers with
a constant discount factor. This means that we have ruled out shocks that aﬀect the supply
of funds on ﬁnancial markets. If we interpret our model as a model of a single “sector”
(as we did in section 5.2.2), then the assumption of constant interest rates and risk premia
may be reasonable. On the other hand, if we interpret the model as an aggregate model,
20then the interaction between the consumers’ stochastic discount factor and q might have
interesting consequences for aggregate behavior.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Using the fact that W (v,b,0,X)=v − b,a n dW (v,b,1,X)=φ(X)(v − b),t h eﬁrst
order conditions of problem (P) c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
1 − λ + ξ =0
−βE (1 − γ)H
¡
X0|X
¢
φ
¡
X0¢
+ λβ (1 − γ)H
¡
X0|X
¢
− μ
¡
1,X0¢
=0
−βEγH
¡
X0|X
¢
+ λβγH
¡
X0|X
¢
− μ
¡
0,X0¢
=0
βE
X
X0∈−(X)
[
¡
γ +( 1− γ)φ
¡
X0¢¢
R
¡
X0¢
H
¡
X0|X
¢
+ μ
¡
1,X0¢
θR
¡
X0¢
+
+μ
¡
0,X0¢
θR
¡
X0¢
− λqm (X)+ψ =0
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint ??, μ(χ0,X0) is the Lagrange
multipliers on the collateral constraint in state (χ0,X0),a n dξ and ψ are the Lagrange
multiplier on the non-negativity constraint for, respectively, cE and k0 (implicit in problem
(P)). Let Γ(X) be the set of realizations of X0 that have positive probability according to
H (X0|X), this set is assumed to be ﬁnite, which is consistent with the recursive equilibria
studied. The envelope condition implies that
φ(X)=λ.
Therefore, the conditions μ ≥ 0 imply that, if H (X0|X) > 0, then:
βEφ
¡
X0¢
≤ βφ(X), (17)
βE ≤ βφ(X). (18)
Substituting the μ and rearranging the last optimality condition we obtain:
βE
X
X0∈−(X)
[
¡
γ +( 1− γ)φ
¡
X0¢¢
(1 − θ)R
¡
X0¢
]H
¡
X0|X
¢
+
−λ
⎛
⎝qm (X) − βθ
X
X0∈−(X)
R
¡
X0¢
H
¡
X0|X
¢
⎞
⎠ + v =0
which, together with the envelope condition gives:
φ(X)=
βE (1 − θ)E[(γ +( 1− γ)φ(X0))R(X0)|X]+ψ
qm (X) − βθE[R(X0)|X]
.
Deﬁnition of Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium, with linear policies for the entrepreneurs and risk
neutral asset pricing, is given by:
(i) a transition probability H (X0|X),w h e r eX = {K,B,s};
(ii) pricing functions R(X),qm (X),w(X);a n d
(iii) policy functions cE (v,b,χ,X),k0 (v,b,χ,X),d(v,b,χ,X) and b0 (χ0,X0;v,b,χ,X),
that are linear in v − b;11
11The ﬁrst two arguments of the b
0 function reﬂect the state contingent nature of the optimal contract
chosen in state (v,b,χ,X).
The restriction to policy functions that are linear in v − b is justiﬁed, given Proposition (2).
22which satisfy the following conditions:
(a) the policies in (iii) are optimal for problem (P) in section 3.2, given the transition
H;
(b) the functions R(X),qm (X) and w(X) satisfy the following equations (these condi-
tions embed market clearing in the used capital market and in the labor market):
R(X)=A(s)F1 (K,1) − G2
¡
k0 (V,B,1,X),K
¢
,
qm (X)=G1
¡
k0 (V,B,1,X),K
¢
,
V = R(X)K,
w(X)=A(s)F2 (K,1);
(c) the following inequality is satisﬁed (this condition ensures market clearing in the
consumption goods’ market, with ct > 0)
A(s)F1 (K,1) − G
¡
k0 (R(X)K,B,1,X),K
¢
+
− γcE (R(X)K,B,0,X) − (1 − γ)cE (R(X)K,B,1,X)+
− γd(R(X)K,B,0,X) − (1 − γ)d(R(X)K,B,0,X) > 0
(d) the transition for s0 is consistent with π(s0|s); the transition probabilities for K0 and
B0 are consistent with the following:
K0 = k0 (R(X)K,B,1,X) with probability 1,
B0 =( 1 − γ)b0 ¡
1,
©
K0,B0,s 0ª
;V,B,1,X
¢
− γw(X)lE with probability π
¡
s0|s
¢
.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Part I. Deterministic steady state
Consider the case of a deterministic steady state. Let productivity be constant At = ˆ A.
In this case, we have qm
t =1and qo
t =1− δ. The steady state capital stock ˆ K and gross
return ˆ R can be found as the solution of:
³
1 − βθˆ R
´
ˆ K =( 1 − γ)(1− θ) ˆ R ˆ K + γ ˆ wLE
ˆ R = ˆ AFK
³
ˆ K,1
´
+1− δ
It is straightforward to show that ˆ K is an increasing function of θ,t h a ta sθ → 0 also ˆ K → 0
and that there exists a θ∗ < 1 such that βE ˆ R =1 .12 The marginal utility of entrepreneurial
wealth, ˆ φ,s a t i s ﬁes
ˆ φ
γ +( 1− γ) ˆ φ
=
(1 − θ)βE ˆ R
1 − θβ ˆ R
.
If the following condition is satisﬁed
βE ˆ R>1,
12In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function the steady state capital stock can be obtained
analytically and is equal to:
ˆ K =
µ
αβθ + α(1 − γ)(1− θ)+γ (1 − α)LE
1 − (βθ +( 1− γ)(1− θ))(1 − δ)
¶ 1
1−α
.
23then φ>1 and both (17) and (18) are satisﬁed. Given the discussion above this condition
is satisﬁed as long as
θ<θ ∗.( A 1 )
Part II. Stability
To analyze the stability properties of the steady state we can linearize the transition
equation (14) and use the deﬁnition of Rt. We get the following second order equation for
kt+1 =l nKt − ln ˆ K,
α2kt+2 + α1kt+1 + α0kt =0
where
α2 = βθξ
α1 = −
h
ξ +1− βθR+ βθ
³
ξ + α(1 − α) ˆ Kα−1
´
− (1 − γ)(1− θ)ξ
i
α0 =
h
ξ + α(1 − α)(γLE − (1 − γ)(1− θ)) ˆ Kα−1 +( R − ξ)(1− γ)(1− θ)
i
Provided that
α2
1 − α0α2 > 0 (A2)
it is possible to show that the steady state ˆ K is saddle-path stable. Then with bounded
shocks we can construct a stable stochastic steady state K. One can then establish the
continuity of the function φ with respect to the parameters A(s) and show that φt is
bounded in [φ,φ]. Finally, it is possible to ﬁnd a small enough value of A−A such that the
bounds for φt satisfy
φβ>β Eφ.
This guarantees that the ﬁnancial constraint is always binding.
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